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Assertions are the center of gravity in social epistemology. They are the
vehicles we use to exchange information within scientific groups and society
as a whole. It is therefore essential to determine under which conditions we are
permitted to make an assertion. In this paper we argue and provide empirical
evidence for the view that the norm of assertion is justified belief: truth or
even knowledge are not required. Our results challenge the knowledge account
advocated by, e.g., Williamson (1996), in general, and more specifically, put
into question several studies conducted by Turri (2013, 2016) that support a
knowledge norm of assertion. Instead, the justified belief account championed
by, e.g. Douven (2006), seems to prevail.
1 Introduction
Many of our speech acts serve the purpose of informing others about what is
the case or stating what is true. These speech acts are typically called asser-
tions. As such, assertions have played a central role in social epistemology.
One of the most fundamental topics within social epistemology concerns the
question about when people are justified to adopt a belief in light of testimo-
nial evidence; or, more plainly, when is it admissible to trust the assertions of
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others? It is essential to note that this question cannot be answered without
first providing an answer to the question of what the norm of assertion is. In
particular, before we can expound on when we are justified to adopt beliefs
on the basis of the assertions of others, it is essential to say under which
conditions we are permitted to make an assertion in the first place. If the
accepted norm of assertion were that one is permitted to assert p whenever
asserting p would make others laugh, then we certainly should adopt strict
norms concerning when it is epistemically admissible to trust the asserti-
ons of others. If, on the other hand, the norm of assertion were that one is
permitted to assert p only if one knows p, then we should be very liberal
concerning our trust in the assertion of others, i.e. then we might say that
one is justified in believing that p, whenever someone asserts p, unless one
has good reasons to doubt that a person respects that norm. If the members
of the society really comply with such a strong norm of assertion, we might
say that it is admissible to believe p given testimony that p even if we have
counter-evidence that supports non-p. It is indeed rarely recognized that the
question about when people are justified to trust the assertions of others
cannot be answered without first detailing the norms of assertions.
Various accounts regarding the norms of assertion have been proposed
during the last 15 years. Our investigation in this paper concerns the three,
arguably, most influential accounts that have been discussed in the literature:
(Knowledge) Assert p only if you know that p.
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(True Belief) Assert p only if you believe p & p is true.
(Justified Belief) Assert p only if you believe p with justification.
At least since Gettier (1963) the classical account of knowledge, i.e. that
knowledge is justified true belief, is considered to be problematic. Neverthe-
less, most, if not all advocates of (Knowledge) agree that knowing p entails
having a justified, true belief in p. Given such an understanding of knowled-
ge, all three proposals require that a person believes what she asserts. We
will presuppose this as a minimal norm of assertion in this paper and disre-
gard norms of assertion that do not imply it (but see Lackey (2007) for an
account that does not require belief). These three accounts therefore differ
with respect to the role they ascribe to truth and justification. (Knowled-
ge) and (True Belief) both posit that p should not be asserted if p is false.
(Knowledge) and (Justified Belief) both claim that p should not be asserted
if p is not believed with justification.
The question of what the norms of assertions are in a given society is
partly a conceptual and partly an empirical question, and depends on which
speech acts we are willing to pin the conceptual label “assertion“ on.1 There is
some debate in the literature on whether the suggested norms of assertion are
constitutive for assertions or merely regulative. If they were constitutive for
1 Apart from the descriptive question, there is, of course, also the normative question of
what the norms of assertion should be in a given society. Although we remain largely
silent on this matter, we do believe that the epistemic goals of a society are likely to
provide important boundary conditions on what the norms of assertion are; see also the
General Discussion.
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assertions, then it would be a conceptual matter that we do not pin the label
“assertion“on speech acts for which we know that they violate the respective
norm. Alternatively, these norms of assertions might only be regulative and,
thus, presuppose “that there is something that counts as asserting, and [the
regulative norms] tell us what an asserter ought to be aiming at when per-
forming the speech act“ (Maitra 2011, 282). However, whatever stand one
takes on this issue, almost everyone agrees that these norms, if correct, have
observable consequences concerning our social practice. It is for this reason
that hypotheses about norms of assertion can be confirmed or disconfirmed
by empirical data. For example, Williamson (1996), a champion of (Knowled-
ge), openly admits that ordinary speakers follow (Knowledge) implicitly and
that therefore empirical investigations into the practice of assertions among
ordinary speakers can only reveal that (Knowledge) is the best explanation
for their behavior. Similarly open to empirical research, Douven (2006), a
defender of (Justified Belief), writes:
In my view the project of determining which rule governs the practice
of assertion is best conceived not as an a priori investigation into
the nature of assertion but, rather, as an empirical project and that
therefore any proposal made in the course of this project is subject
to the exact same standards of evaluation as are employed in the
empirical sciences generally. That is to say, any hypothesis stating
that a particular rule governs the practice of assertion must face the
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linguistic data about that practice. (Douven 2006, 450)
However, even if it is universally acknowledged that discovering the norms of
assertion is partly an empirical project, the empirical means that we ought to
employ in this project are disputed. Most philosophers engaging in the debate
rely on intuitions and linguistic data. However, philosophers usually do not
collect linguistic data systematically, but often seem to cherry-pick data that
supports their particular theory best. In addition, linguistic data can be
accounted for in various ways, and it is not always clear whether a given
norm of assertion is the best explanation for the linguistic data. Williamson
(2000), for example, is well aware that many of his linguistic data can be
explained via various other Gricean norms of conversation. More importantly,
that these data points are not decisive in favoring one or the other theory
is convincingly shown by Douven (2006). He argues that (Justified Belief)
is the better, or at least equally suited account to explain the same data
Williamson relies upon.
For example, one of Williamson’s reasons in support of (Knowledge) con-
sists in the following linguistic datum: the question “How do you know?” is
a proper response to an assertion. According to Williamson, the linguistic
data suggests that we presuppose that the asserter knows that p whenever
she asserts that p. For Williamson, the best explanation for this linguistic
datum is that one is permitted to assert that p only if one knows that p.
Accordingly, when we ask “How do you know?” we question whether the as-
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serter fulfills all the relevant requirements for being permitted to assert that
p. Douven (2006), who argues in favor of a version of (Justified Belief), also
believes that we have “to face the linguistic data” (Douven 2006, 45), but he
does believe (Justified Belief) can explain the data equally well. Note, the
adequate response by the asserter in response to the question “How do you
know?” is to provide her reasons for why she believes p, nothing in addition
is required from the asserter. Now, Douven thinks that asking “How do you
know?” is simply the way we ask for reasons as to why one believes p; and we
ask the way we do because typically when someone is justified in believing p,
she knows that p or, at least, takes herself to know that p. Thus, according
to Douven, we can account for the linguistic data by assuming that (Justified
Belief) holds for assertions and by also assuming that typically, when someo-
ne is justified in believing p, this person typically knows that p. It seems
then that the truth about norms of assertion is underdetermined given the
linguistic data that is available (see Pagin (2016) for an extended discussion
on the question of underdetermination).
Given the standstill in the debate surrounding the available linguistic
data, some philosophers have tried to tackle the empirical project with more
potent means, the means of experimental philosophy. This turn has been
called for in the literature. For example, in the SEP entry on assertion, Pagin
(2015) states that
Virtually throughout the discussion, authors have simply appealed
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to their own intuitions. However, this is an area where experimental
philosophy would be highly relevant, since the question largely seems
to concern what norms ordinary asserters accept. (Pagin, 2015)
Recently, this call for more experimental work has been followed. In parti-
cular, Turri has taken an experimental approach to answering the question
of what the norm of assertion is. Such an approach is warranted in his view
“because competing theories about the norm of assertion generate testable
predictions” (Turri 2016, 11). Indeed, Turri has conducted most experimen-
tal work on this subject matter, in part in collaboration with several other
philosophers. In a host of articles, Turri (Turri 2013, Turri 2015, Turri 2017)
has collected empirical data that seem to support the knowledge account of
assertion. Most of the experimental work conducted for the present paper
takes its inspiration from Turri’s approach to tackle these questions empi-
rically and aims to improve upon it in certain respects. Thus, in Section 2,
we outline Turri’s central experimental studies and criticize key aspects of
them. In Section 3, we test our claims by manipulating these key aspects in
Study 1. In Section 4, we investigate the relative importance of truth and
justification in two further experiments. Section 5 summarizes our results
and discusses possible limitations to our account.
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2 Previous Studies and Criticism
Turri himself raises what he considers to be the most pressing objection
against the knowledge account of assertion.2
Critics of the knowledge account report having the intuition that rea-
sonable false assertions are perfectly fine. They claim that this intuiti-
on is “obvious” and reflects ordinary practice (Hill & Schechter 2007,
109; Douven 2006, 476ff). Stronger yet, some claim that there is “no
intuitive sense” in which a reasonable false assertion is improper, and
that “there is no practice” of counting them as inappropriate (Douven
2006, 480; Hill & Schechter 2007, 109). (Turri 2013, 39-40)
In order to counter this objection, Turri (2013) designed a vignette to probe
whether laypeople indeed think it permissible to assert a false proposition if
it is reasonable to hold that proposition.
Maria is a watch collector. She owns so many watches that she cannot
keep track of them all by memory alone. So she maintains a detailed
inventory of them. She keeps the inventory up to date. Maria knows
that the inventory is not perfect, but it is extremely accurate. Today
Maria is having guests over for dinner. Soon after dinner is served,
one of her guests asks, “Maria, do you have a 1990 Rolex Submariner
2 No doubt, Turri has conducted several more studies in various other papers that he takes
to provide additional support for the knowledge account. However, as far as we know,
none of the other studies put the justified belief account to test in a similarly direct
fashion.
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in your watch collection?” Maria consults her inventory. It says that
she does have a 1990 Rolex Submariner in her collection. [But this
is one of those rare cases where the inventory is wrong: she does not
have one/And this is just another case where the inventory is exactly
right: she does have one].
Directly following the vignette, participants answered various test questions
and some comprehension questions. The comprehension questions were asked
to check whether the participants had understood the vignette adequately
and also to draw their attention to the relevant aspect of the vignette: the
truth of a given statement. This set up was chosen to check whether the
truth of an assertion had an effect on whether the participants considered
the assertion admissible or not. Turri designed four experiments based on this
vignette; and in all four experiments participants were asked whether Maria
should say that there is a 1990 Rolex Submariner in her watch collection.3
The responses painted a clear picture according to which the majority
of those participants, who were presented with the condition in which the
inventory is wrong, claimed that Maria should not assert that she has a 1990
Rolex Submariner in her collection. Thus, people did not seem to think that
Maria should assert that p despite being justified in believing that p. Only in
3 To be more precise, in one of these four experiments they were asked “How should Maria
answer her neighbor’s question?” Participants responded on a 7-point Likert scale. The
options varied whether and how strongly Maria should claim or deny that the watch
is in her collection. In conditions where the inventory says that Maria does have the
watch (positive conditions), participants chose from the following options, left-to-right:
“I definitely do have one”; “I do have one”; “I probably do have one”; “It’s unclear”; “I
probably don’t have one”; “I don’t have one”; “I definitely don’t have one”.
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the condition in which the inventory is correct, did people judge that Maria
should say that she is in possession of the Rolex watch. On these grounds,
Turri excludes (Justified Belief) as the appropriate norm of assertion. Given
that (Knowledge) can explain various linguistic data that (True Belief) cer-
tainly cannot explain, Turri concludes that (Knowledge) must be the correct
account of our norm of assertion (Turri 2016).
We believe that accepting this conclusion would be premature. In the
following, we first set out our twofold criticism of Turri’s experimental set
up.4 One criticism is directed at the vignette, another criticism is directed
at the way people are prompted to respond to the vignette that is offered
in Turri’s experimental set up. These criticisms are driven by philosophical
considerations alone. However, if our points of criticism are correct, then
they will point at some crucial variations of Turri’s set up that one has to
empirically investigate.
Our first criticism concerns the vignette itself. In the vignette the partici-
pants are told that “Maria knows that the inventory is not perfect, but [that]
it is extremely accurate.” Here the vignette emphasizes that Maria is aware
of one relevant error possibility, i.e. that the inventory is malfunctioning on
the given occasion, and that she has not taken any efforts to rule it out.
Thus, some participants might reason that she is not really justified (or at
least not to a sufficient degree) in believing that there is a 1990 Rolex in her
4 Pagin (2015) raises doubts about the consistency of Turri’s results. In this paper we go
further in putting forward a two-fold criticism against the experimental setup.
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watch collection because she cannot exclude all relevant alternatives. Thus,
our first proposal is to delete the respective sentence from the vignette. It
should read:
Maria is a watch collector. She owns so many watches that she cannot
keep track of them all by memory alone. So she maintains a detailed
inventory of them. She keeps the inventory up to date. [—] Today
Maria is having guests over for dinner. Soon after dinner is served,
one of her guests asks, “Maria, do you have a 1990 Rolex Submariner
in your watch collection?” Maria consults her inventory. It says that
she does have a 1990 Rolex Submariner in her collection. [But this
is one of those rare cases where the inventory is wrong: she does not
have one/And this is just another case where the inventory is exactly
right: she does have one].
Note, if (Knowledge) were the correct norm of assertion then people’s respon-
ses to the revised vignette should paint a similar picture as the responses in
Turri’s original study. In one case, Maria does not know that she has a 1990
Rolex in her watch collection, because the relevant statement is false. If one
wants to criticize this vignette at all, then one should do so for not specifying
to a sufficient degree that Maria is justified in believing that she owns a 1990
Rolex Submariner. The vignette now does not explicitly state the inventory
is extremely accurate. Thus, so the possible criticism goes, the participants
might judge that Maria does not know that she possesses such a Rolex inde-
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pendently of the truth of the given claim. However, first, we think that the
lines “So she maintains a detailed inventory of them. She keeps the inventory
up to date.” make it pretty clear that Maria does not need to worry about the
inventory’s fallibility. Second, we will see in section 4 that this is not what is
going on.5
Our second criticism concerns the possible response options provided in
Turri’s experimental set up. Remember, in three of four experiments par-
ticipants were asked whether Maria should say that there is a 1990 Rolex
Submariner in her watch collection and in the fourth experiment they were
asked: “How should Maria answer her neighbor’s question?” We think it is
improper to ask what Maria should say.6
First, asking whether Maria should say that there is a 1990 Rolex Sub-
mariner in her collection is problematic. In particular, when the participants’
response is that Maria should not say that there is 1990 Rolex in her col-
5 In his 2017 paper, Turri replicated his findings using the same problematic vignette as
stated above. He also conducted a second experiment yielding similar results in which
no error possibility was explicitly mentioned. However, in that second experiment, a
vignette was used in which a protagonist jumps to the premature conclusion that a shot
was fired from hearing a loud bang. Hence, one could argue that the vignette describes
a case in which a person is not sufficiently justified to make the claim in question.
Independently of the question of whether or not this second vignette is problematic, we
will see that our variation of Turri’s original vignette leads to severe problems for the
knowledge account.
6 We would like to add that Turri does not defend the knowledge account in the form stated
above: Assert p only if you know that p. Rather, he advocates the knowledge account
in the form “you should assert Q only if you know Q” (2013, 281). It is therefore not
surprising that Turri has asked his participants a should question. It is an open question
whether the knowledge account in its more general form can be properly cast in the way
Turri suggests. In any case, our two-pronged criticism below applies independently of
the exact framing of the knowledge account.
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lection, then we still do not know why she should not say it. The reason is
that the term should can be used to express an obligation but also to express
instrumental expediency. Turri interprets should as expressing an obligati-
on and he therefore thinks that the responses by the participants support
(Knowledge). He writes “researchers working on the norm of assertion have
accepted, often implicitly, several assumptions. [...] They assume that the
rule is deontological because the ‘should’ expresses the concept of permissi-
on; you have permission or authority to assert only under certain conditions,
and to do otherwise is impermissible” (Turri 2016, 61). Thus, the explanation
that Turri favors is that Maria should not assert that there is a 1990 Rolex
Submariner in her collection, because she is not permitted to do so according
to the knowledge norm of assertion.
An alternative explanation is that Maria should not assert that there
is a 1990 Rolex Submariner in her collection, because this would neither
be expedient to the typical goals of a conversation nor expedient to her
particular goals as given in the vignette. In particular, from the vignette
the participant understands that Maria honestly aims at saying something
true about her watch collection and that, given that the statement is false,
she would not reach this goal. This reasoning, however, is independent of
the norm of assertion. It might perfectly well be the case that the norm of
assertion allows her to assert something false, but she nevertheless should not
do so because it would not be expedient to her goals in the given situation.7
7 For illustration consider the false-belief task (Perner et al.,1987). The participants (typi-
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Second, note, even if should were expressing an obligation and (Know-
ledge) were the correct norm of assertion, from knowing p it does not follow
that one should assert p. Instead the converse is true: if (Knowledge) is the
correct norm of assertion then one should or ought to know that p whenever
one asserts that p. This feature of (Knowledge) is used to explain why the
question “How do you know?” is a proper response to an assertion: it is a
proper response because if one asserts that p, then one can presuppose that
the asserter knows that p, because that is what she should do in order to
satisfy (Knowledge). We therefore suggest that one asks whether Maria is
permitted to say that there is a 1990 Rolex Submariner in her watch collec-
tion. Note again, if (Knowledge) were the correct norm of assertion then the
responses to the revised question should yield similar answers in response to
Turri’s original question. After all the following is correct: If Maria knows
cally children or infants) are shown two containers, and then one person places an object
in one of these containers and subsequently leaves the room. A second person enters the
room and switches the object into the other container and also leaves. When the first
person returns, the participant is asked where will the person look for the hidden object?
The participant fails the test if he or she thinks the person will look for the object at
its actual place, indicating that he / she fails to understand that the person has the
false belief that the object still is in the container in which it was initially hidden. Now
suppose we ask the participant: should the person look for the object in the container in
which it was originally placed? Here the correct answer seems to be ‘No’. It should not
look for the object in its original hiding spot. The explanation for that answer, however,
has nothing to do with any norms of rational action or belief. She should not look at
the original hiding spot simply because she will not find the object there (for a similar
argument see Ben Yami et al. 2015). Asking for where the person should look for the
object in the false belief task aims at determining what action will lead the person to
reach her goal. Applied to our case at hand, when we are asking whether she should
assert p if she has good reasons to belief p even if it is false, then the answer might well
be that she should not assert p because contrary to her intentions she would be saying
something false, but that she is of course permitted to assert p since she is justified to
say so.
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that there is a 1990 Rolex in her collection then she is permitted to assert
it, but Maria would not be permitted to make that assertion if she does not
know it. In those instances of the vignette in which the claim is false, she
does not know it and therefore participants can be expected to answer that
she is not permitted to say that there is such a watch in her collection.
We raised two points of criticism against Turri’s experimental set up
and we argued that if (Knowledge) is the correct norm of assertion then
these changes should not make a difference. First, we suggested that we
should delete the sentence “Maria knows that the inventory is not perfect,
but [that] it is extremely accurate.” Thus the vignette no longer emphasizes
that Maria is aware of one relevant error possibility. This does not change
the overall set up, because Maria still does not know that there is a 1990
Rolex in her collection, because that assertion is false. Second, we suggested
that we should ask whether Maria is permitted to assert that there is such
a Rolex in her collection instead of asking whether she should say it. Again,
from the perspective of (Knowledge), this variation is not supposed to make
a difference. According to (Knowledge), if Maria does not know that there
is a 1990 Rolex in her collection, then she is not permitted to make that
assertion. In the following sections, we will now report our findings.
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3 Study 1: Evidence Against (True Belief)
and (Knowledge)
In the previous section, we discussed experimental studies that seem to pro-
vide evidence for the knowledge account of assertion. However, we also raised
several objections against the empirical work, specifically about the content
of the questionnaires that were designed to show the falsity of the justified
belief account of assertion. We will now present new empirical work that
questions the conclusions drawn from previous experiments. Given the con-
cerns raised above, the purpose of Study 1 was twofold. First, we intended
to replicate the results by Turri (2013) according to which people deny that
a person may assert a false claim under certain conditions. Second, by ma-
nipulating two aspects of the vignette that we identified as crucial for these
tests, we investigated whether the true belief and knowledge account indeed
provide an empirically adequate theory of the conditions for assertion.
3.1 Methods
For Study 1, 213 participants (98 women, Mage = 33.93, SD = 10.75) were
recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk and paid a small fee for their parti-
cipation. All participants were native English speakers. In order to replicate
Turri’s results we used a vignette almost identical to the one he used in his
2013 paper.
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Maria is a watch collector. She owns so many watches that she uses
an electronic database to keep track of all her watches. Maria knows
that the database does not function perfectly, but is extremely accu-
rate. Today Maria is having guests over for dinner. Soon after dinner
is served, one of her guests asks, “Maria, do you have a 1990 Rolex
Submariner in your watch collection?” Maria consults her electronic
database, which states that she does have a 1990 Rolex Submariner
in her watch collection. So Maria says: “Yes, I do have a 1990 Rolex
Submariner in my collection.” However, this is one of those rare ca-
ses in which the electronic database was malfunctioning and wrongly
stated that she has a Rolex Submariner in her watch collection.
Should Maria tell her guest that she has a 1990 Rolex Submariner in
her collection?
The participants were presented with three options: (1) Yes. (2) No. (3) Other
/ Don’t know. We then manipulated two aspects of the vignette. First, instead
of asking the participants whether Maria should (N=54) tell her guest that
she has a 1990 Rolex Submariner in her collection, we asked them (N=65):
Was Maria permitted to tell her guest that she has a 1990 Rolex
Submariner in her collection?
Second, we eliminated from the vignette the information “Maria knows that
the database does not function perfectly, but is extremely accurate”. As we
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have argued above, knowing that a system is fallible might affect people’s
responses regarding the assertion conditions of a false statement. Thus, the
alternative scenario read:
Maria is a watch collector. She owns so many watches that she uses
an electronic database to keep track of all her watches. Today Ma-
ria is having guests over for dinner. Soon after dinner is served, one
of her guests asks, “Maria, do you have a 1990 Rolex Submariner in
your watch collection?” Maria consults her electronic database, which
states that she does have a 1990 Rolex Submariner in her watch col-
lection. So Maria says: “Yes, I do have a 1990 Rolex Submariner in
my collection.” However, unbeknownst to Maria, the electronic da-
tabase was malfunctioning and wrongly stated that she has a Rolex
Submariner in her watch collection.
Again, we asked people either the should question (N=56) or the permission
question (N=49), and presented them with three options: (1) Yes. (2) No.
(3) Other / Don’t know. After the main question was raised, we also asked
each subject to briefly explain why they had responded the way they did. All
participants were randomly assigned to either one of the four conditions of
the 2× 2 experimental design.
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3.2 Results
Pearson’s χ2-tests were used to determine significant relationships between
two scenarios in the 2 × 2 experimental design, operating with a 2 × 2 × 3
contingency table. Repeating Pearson’s χ2 - test for various pairwise compa-
risons made it necessary to adjust the level of significance. Having limited our
analysis to 3 pairwise comparisons, the level of significance reduced to 0.016
(using conservative Bonferroni correction). We started our analysis with the
original scenarios in which Maria is aware of the fallibility of the electro-
nic database. As can been seen in Figure 1, left hand side (dark grey bars),
when the should question was asked, a majority of the participants did not
believe that Maria should tell her guest that she has the Rolex watch in
her collection, replicating a crucial finding of Turri (2013). However, when
the question was changed from should (dark grey bars) to permission (light
grey bars), a significant impact was found on people’s answers. Whereas the
‘Yes’ responses increased from 18.5% to 76.9%, the ‘No’ responses dropped
from 68.5% to 13.8%: (χ2 = 43.14; p < 0.001, Cramer’s V = 0.6).8 We then
compared (Figure 1, right hand side) the original scenario (doubt) with the
case in which information about the fallibility of the database was deleted
(no doubt). In both scenarios the should question was asked. The analysis
revealed that changing information about the fallibility of the database also
changed the response patterns significantly: the amount of ‘Yes’ responses
rose from 18.5% to 62.5%, whereas the percentage of ‘No’ responses fell from
8 For similar results, cf. Kneer (forthcoming)
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68.5% to 35.7%, (χ2 = 23.43; p < 0.001, Cramer’s V = 0.5). The third compa-
rison contrasted the original case (should, doubt) with the scenario in which
both factors were manipulated (permission, no doubt). An even stronger ef-
fect was noted in which ‘Yes’ responses rose to 87.8% and ‘No’ responses
dropped to 8.2% (χ2 = 49.760; p < 0.001, Cramer’s V = 0.7, not depicted in
Figure 1).
Figure 1 Responses in % to the scenarios of Study 1 in which both the question type (left hand) and
the scenario type (right hand) were manipulated.
Discussion
In Study 1, we successfully replicated Turri’s results, suggesting that un-
der certain conditions, people do not believe that a person should make a
false statement even if that person has reasons to believe her statement to be
true. However, the data also demonstrate that this result cannot be drawn
upon to support (Knowledge) or (True Belief). Indeed, our results put se-
rious pressure on both accounts. Two factors were identified in the original
experiment that might have skewed the results in Turri’s favor. First, in the
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original vignette the protagonist knew about the fallibility of her source.
In order to show that people endorse the knowledge account of assertion,
such doubts should be excluded from the vignette. Second, asking whether
a person should make a statement is a much stronger request than asking
whether a person is permitted to make that statement – we have argued in
Section 2 that an empirical inquiry into the norm of assertion should use
the latter question. As hypothesized, both factors had a crucial impact on
people’s views. Once any belief about the fallibility of the source of Maria’s
knowledge was removed, a significant and substantial majority claimed that
the protagonist Maria was in the right position to make a false assertion.
This was true regardless of whether the participants in our study responded
to the should or the permission question. When people were drawn to the
permission scenario, an even greater majority (87.8%) approved of Maria’s
assertion, indicating that the type of request makes an important difference
even if doubts about the fallibility of the source are removed.
When we kept the knowledge of the source’s fallibility inside the vignette,
the response patterns differed widely between the should and the permissi-
on question. Whereas the should responses matched those of Turri’s original
investigation, the permission responses delivered a very different verdict: a
clear majority of 76.9% stated that Maria was permitted to make a false as-
sertion, suggesting that the predictions of the knowledge account of assertion
are false.
While our reasoning about the effects of changing the wording of the
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question and the awareness of the fallibility seems plausible, how do we know
that our account is explanatorily adequate? As stated above, we also asked
the participants of our study to briefly explain their responses. Importantly,
when we contrasted the responses of the two scenarios in which we asked the
should question but manipulated Maria’s awareness about the fallibility of
the electronic database, then the explanations for the ‘No’ responses reflected
this difference. E.g., in the original scenario, participants stated that “If she
can’t verify for certain then she should say ‘no’ until she does know for
certain”, “If she knows that the database is malfunctioning, then she knows
that she does not own said watch thus, she shouldn’t claim to.”, “She knew
that her database malfunctions albeit rarely and therefore she knew that
she couldn’t say for sure without checking her collection”, “If Maria knows
the database is not 100% reliable, she should not make a definitive statement
about her inventory based on it.” Thus, when evaluating whether or not Maria
should make that assertion, readers of the vignette did not focus on Maria’s
knowledge that the database is highly reliable, but instead attended to the
fact that Maria knows that the database is not perfect. In contrast, in the
scenario in which Maria’s awareness of the possible failure of the database is
eliminated, the majority of the participants explained their ‘Yes’ responses
by claiming, e.g., that “Since she doesn’t know it is malfunctioning, then she
has no reason to distrust what the machine is telling her.”, “She doesn’t know
that the system is malfunctioning, so as far as she knows, she does have that
watch.”, “The database told her that she had one. She did not know that it
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was wrong so I feel she should say yes.”
Interestingly, in the scenario in which Maria is aware of the malfunctioning
database but asked the permission question, most participants are far more
forgiving compared to the same scenario followed by the should question.
Typical responses were: “She is allowed based on the information that she
had at her disposal.”, “She had no way of knowing when the program would
malfunction, and the story stated that this was a rare case”, “Since her
database functions correctly most of the time, it was very likely that she
had the specific watch”. The responses hence reveal that the bar for being
permitted to make an assertion is substantially lowered. The results of Study
1 therefore seem to show that the justified belief account has not been shown
to be mistaken.
4 Study 2: Evidence for (Justified Belief)
Advocates of (Knowledge) and (True Belief) claim that we are not permitted
to assert p if p is false – even if we are justified in believing p.9 Some of
Turri’s empirical studies suggested that they could well be right. However,
the results of Study 1 not only demonstrate that the interpretation of pre-
vious studies was premature, they show that there are at least some cases, in
which people reject the idea that truth is necessary for making an assertion
when a person is clearly justified. But while the results of Study 1 do put
9 Williamson acknowledges the widespread use of false morally permissible assertions but
maintains that they violate the norm of assertion.
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into doubt (Knowledge) and (True Belief), they do not exclude the possibi-
lity that the justified belief account is also false. The data we obtained in
Study 1 are, of course, consistent with the idea that the norm of assertion
is justified belief, but in order to empirically investigate whether the justi-
fied belief account prevails, further experiments are required. The purpose of
Study 2 is to test more generally which of the three accounts laid out above
best accords with laypeople’s judgements. We therefore designed two sets of
scenarios that directly pitted truth against justification. More specifically, we
developed and manipulated scenarios that allowed the pairwise comparison
of the importance of truth and justification for the norm of assertion.
4.1 Study 2A
4.1.1 Methods
We randomly assigned 91 participants to two different scenarios.10 Four parti-
cipants were excluded for not having finished the survey. Scenario A1 (N=44)
was designed such that the main protagonist of the scenario was justified in
believing p, although p was false. In contrast, in scenario A2 (N=43), the
main protagonist made an assertion that was true but which s/he was not
justified in believing. If the justified belief account is correct, then we expect
the participants to (a) approve S’s making of the false assertion p when S is
justified in believing p and (b) reject S’s making of the true assertion q when
10Participants were recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. The same restrictions
were applied in all experiments of Study 2 as in Study 1.
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S is not justified in believing q.
Each participant was presented with only a single vignette. After each
scenario, we asked the participants whether the protagonist of the scenario
was permitted to make the respective assertion.
Scenario A1: (Justified but not true)
Maria is a watch collector. She keeps all her watches in a safe and
enjoys looking at her collection regularly. One day, her friend John
asks her, whether she has a 1990 Rolex Submariner in her safe and,
if so, could show it to him. Maria answers: “There is a 1990 Rolex
Submariner in my safe.” She does say so, because she had purchased
that watch a few years ago and has seen that watch lately in her
safe. When Maria opens the safe a few minutes later, she finds out
that a burglar has stolen several watches, among them the 1990 Rolex
Submariner.
Q: Was Maria permitted to tell John that there is a 1990 Rolex Sub-
mariner in her safe?
R1: Yes, because she had purchased that watch and has seen it lately
in her safe.
R2: No, because there is no 1990 Rolex Submariner in her safe.
R3: Other / Don’t know.
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Scenario A2: (True but not justified)
Maria is a watch collector. She keeps all her watches in her safe and
enjoys looking at her collection regularly. One day, her friend John
asks her, whether she has a 1990 Rolex Submariner in her safe and, if
so, could show it to him. Maria answers: “No, there is no 1990 Rolex
Submariner in my safe.” She does say so, although Maria purchased
that watch a few years ago and has seen that watch lately in her safe.
Maria just simply forgot this when John asked her. When Maria opens
the safe a few minutes later, she finds out that a burglar has stolen
several watches, among them the 1990 Rolex Submariner.
Q: Was Maria permitted to tell John that there is no 1990 Rolex
Submariner in her safe?
R1: Yes, because there is no 1990 Rolex Submariner in her safe.
R2: No, because she had purchased that watch and has seen it lately
in her safe.
R3: Other / Don’t know.
After having been presented with the vignette and the test question, we also
asked the participants two control questions: (i) Was Maria’s answer true?
(ii) Was Maria’s answer justified?
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4.1.2 Results
When the participants were asked to judge whether Maria was permitted to
make an assertion that was false but justified (scenario A1), a clear majori-
ty of the participants answered affirmatively. 90.9% (N=40) responded with
‘Yes’ while only a single person answered ‘No’; three participants (6.8%)
selected the ‘Don’t know’ option. In contrast, those participants who were
assigned to scenario A2 in which the protagonist Maria makes an assertion
that is true but unjustified, merely 11 subjects (25.6%) thought that Ma-
ria was permitted to make the assertion. 21 (48.8%) participants responded
with ‘No’ and a further 11 (25.6%) participants opted for ‘Don’t know’. The
percentages are also displayed in Figure 2 (left hand side). A χ2-test revea-
led that the difference in responses between the two scenarios was highly
significant: χ2 = 39.24, p < 0.001, Cramer’s V = 0.7. We also analyzed the
responses of those participants who correctly responded to both control ques-
tions (N=37). Percentages are depicted in Figure 2 (right hand side). Fisher’s
Exact Test was used because no subject who passed both controls answered
‘Don’t know’: χ2 = 26.93, p < 0.001. In both scenarios, the responses were
significantly different from chance level.
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Figure 2 Percentages of the responses for Scenario A1 (False Justified) and Scenario A2 (True
Unjustified) when all participants’ responses were evaluated (left hand side) and when only those
responses from participants were taken into account that passed both comprehension checks (right hand
side).
4.2 Study 2B
Study 2A strongly suggests that when truth and justification are pitted
against each other, subjects judge that a person is permitted to make an
assertion when she is justified and not permitted to do so when not having
justification for her belief. In contrast, (True belief) and (Knowledge) make
wrong predictions about the outcome of the experiment. Before we discuss
these results in detail below (see section 4.3.), we would like to respond to
the possible objection that the results of Study 2A might be down to some
artifact of the story of the vignette or its specific wording that we used. We
will respond to this objection empirically, i.e. we designed two more vignettes
in which the respective importance of truth and justification was tested.
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4.2.1 Methods
86 participants were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk and assi-
gned randomly to one of the two scenarios stated below. Three subjects had
to be excluded as they failed to complete the survey. Similarly, to Study 2A,
scenario B1 was designed as to present a story in which the main protagonist
Robert makes a claim for which he is properly justified but which turns out
to be false. Scenario B2 was only changed in a way such that Robert is not
justified in believing the assertion he makes but in which the claim turns out
to be true.
Scenario B1: (Justified but not true)
Anne and Robert go to a costume party late at night. On their way
to the party, Anne asks Robert whether any of his friends are also
at the party. Robert answers: “Jill is at the party”. He does say so,
because Jill had told Robert a few hours before that she had already
selected a nice dress and was planning to come. When they arrive at
the party, it turns out that Jill had changed her plans, and actually
did not go to the costume party.
Q: Was Robert permitted to tell Anne that Jill would be at the party?
R1: Yes, because Jill had told Robert that she would go.
R2: No, because Jill did not go to the party.
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R3: Other / Don’t know.
Scenario B2: (True but not justified)
Anne and Robert go to a costume party late at night. On their way to
the party, Anne asks Robert whether any of his friends are also at the
party. Robert answers: “Jill is at the party”. He does say so, although
Robert had been told by Jill a few hours before that she would not go
because she did not have a costume to wear and had other plans for
the night. Robert just completely forgot this when Anne asked him.
When they arrive at the party, it turns out that Jill had changed her
plans, and actually is at the costume party.
Q: Was Robert permitted to tell Anne that Jill would be at the party?
R1: Yes, because Jill did go to the party.
R2: No, because Jill had told Robert that she would not go.
R3: Other / Don’t know.
Again, after each scenario, control questions were asked testing subjects’
understanding of truth and justification.
4.2.2 Results
The distribution of responses in scenario B1 (N=42) as well as B2 (N=41)
matches the distribution we obtained in Study 2B qualitatively. When Ro-
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bert asserts a proposition that is false but which he is justified in believing,
a substantial majority (81.0%) of the participants held that Robert is per-
mitted to make the assertion. Only four participants stated that Robert is
not permitted to do so, and a further four participants selected the ‘Don’t
know’ option. The results were reversed in scenario B2 in which Robert tru-
ly asserts that Jill is at the party despite not being justified. 58.5% of the
participants chose ‘No’ when asked whether Robert was permitted to make
that assertion, and 17.1% of the participants chose ‘Yes’. Pearson’s χ2-test
showed that the difference between the two scenarios was highly significant:
χ2 = 34.63, p < 0.001, Cramer’s V = 0.6. Focusing on those participants
who answered both control questions correctly, the distribution of the results
was even more extreme (see Figure 3 for the percentages of the responses in
both cases). For both scenarios, the data reveal significant results, way above
chance level.
Figure 3 Percentage of responses for Scenario B1 (False Justified) and Scenario B2 (True Unjustified)
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4.3 Discussion
Studies 2A and 2B show a remarkable consistency in the distribution of
the responses. This close match allows us to discount an explanation of the
results in terms of an artifact of the particular stories that we presented
participants with. Instead, we are confident that the results we found in
Study 2 are to be accounted for by the manipulations in regards to whether
or not the protagonist’s belief is true and justified. In scenarios A1 and B1,
both Maria and Robert assert propositions that are not true, i.e. do not
correspond with reality. However, both are justified in believing what they
assert: Maria relied on a true memory that she had purchased a watch in the
past. Robert was explicitly told by Jill that she would come to the party. The
recorded results reveal that laypeople believe that a person who is justified
in believing a certain proposition is also permitted to assert the proposition,
even if the proposition is false – confirming the basic outcome of Study 1.
Having gained similar response profiles in both kinds of scenarios, the effect
is likely to be robust.
In scenarios A2 and B2, Maria and Robert assert propositions that are
true but which they are not justified in believing, given their prior epis-
temic state. In both cases, the protagonists forgot information that would
have led them to make different assertions. Their assertions turned out to
be true, albeit through ‘lucky’ circumstances. The results from both experi-
ments provide substantial evidence for (Justified Belief) and further question
the plausibility of (True Belief). While the true belief account falsely predicts
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that most participants should approve of the assertions made because they
were true, the justified belief account correctly predicts that the majority of
the participants will reject that the protagonists were permitted to make the
respective assertions. While the data from A2 and B2 are also consistent with
the knowledge account of assertion, taking into account both studies, the only
account that predicts the results across all studies is (Justified Belief).
5 General Discussion
Studies 1 and 2 provide empirical evidence against both the knowledge ac-
count of assertion as well as the true belief account of assertion. Most em-
pirical work on this subject matter has been conducted by Turri. As such,
our own studies are inspired by his empirical approach to the problem – an
approach we are in full agreement with. Turri (2016) concludes that the sheer
wealth of studies pointing towards the truth of the knowledge account settle
the question on the norm of assertion. The results of our experiments tell
a different story. While many experimental studies conducted by Turri are
consistent with (Knowledge), they are also consistent with (Justified Belief).
The key experiment that was supposed to tackle the issue of whether a justi-
fied belief may be sufficient for making an assertion, has been conducted in
Turri (2013) and Turri (2017). Those experiments have yielded results that
putatively rule out (Justified Belief). However, we have identified (Section
2) two problems (awareness of error possibility and question type) with his
33
experimental set-up that questions the reliability of these results. In Section
3, we replicated Turri’s original results but also demonstrated that once the-
se issues were addressed, the results support more strongly (Justified Belief)
and are inconsistent with (True Belief) and (Knowledge).
Turri (2014) has drawn a distinction between good and permissible asser-
tions that might be used to raise an objection against casting the question
of the norm of assertion in terms of what one is permitted to say instead of
what one should say. Put succinctly, one might worry that our studies have
only shown that a justified false assertion is permissible but not that it is
a good or proper assertion. While some authors have rejected an equivocal
notion of the norms of assertion – see e.g. Lackey (2007) and Kvanvig (2011)
– no consensus has so far emerged on this issue. However, the explanations
we collected from the participants in Study 1 provide additional support that
asking about when an assertion is permitted instead of when someone should
make an assertion does not introduce any confounds but rather addresses
the concerns about the should question that we discussed in Section 2. Im-
portantly, the removal of either of the two problems we analyzed was enough
to reverse the results, supporting (Justified Belief) in both cases. Thus, in
order to show that truth is a necessary part of the norm of assertion and
justified belief insufficient, one would need to show that both objections to
the original set-up are misguided.
The results of Study 1 on their own, are, however, insufficient to show that
justified belief is the norm of assertion. A disjunctive account seems equally
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apt to account for the results. More specifically, the data are consistent with
the idea that a justified belief or a true belief are sufficient for a person to
make an assertion. We therefore designed two sets of vignettes (Study 2) that
pitted truth against justification. The outcome of Study 2A and 2B rule out
the disjunctive account: the majority of the participants hold that a mere
true belief does not permit a person to make an assertion if that person lacks
justification for the belief. Thus, in summary we can state the following:
(True Belief) is not the norm of assertion, because truth is not a
necessary condition for the norm of assertion.
(Knowledge) is not the norm of assertion, because truth is not a ne-
cessary condition for the norm of assertion.
(True Belief or Justified Belief) is not the norm of assertion, because
justification is necessary for being permitted to make an assertion.
(Justified Belief) is, ceteris paribus, the correct norm of assertion,
because having a justified belief is both necessary and sufficient for
being permitted to make an assertion.
Our experiments support (Justified Belief) as the norm of assertion. Howe-
ver, our experiments do not establish (Justified Belief) beyond a reasonable
doubt. For once, we have not directly tested the importance of belief as a
necessary component but primarily focused on the influence of justification.
Second, there is one interesting hypothesis that we did not test for with our
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vignettes; it is the hypothesis that the norm of assertion is context-dependent.
We know from many other empirical studies that people’s intuitions are often
context- and culture-dependent and not straightforwardly generalizable (see
e.g. Machery et al., 2013; Del Pinal & Reuter, 2016). More specifically, which
norm of assertion holds in a given context might depend on (i) the authority
/ expertise of the agents as well as on (ii) the stakes involved.
With respect to (i), we already argued in the introduction that our norms
concerning when to trust the assertions of others should cohere with our
norms of assertion. When we have to trust the assertions of others without
any questions asked, we argued, (Knowledge) might be the appropriate norm
of assertion. Here the asserter is solely responsible for ensuring that the agents
listening learn something true and other agents are permitted to rely on the
assertion without any questions asked. Indeed, when the asserter is an expert,
e.g. a medical doctor, laypersons typically are in such a position. They have
to trust the assertions and judgments of experts because they are not even in
a position to assess possible answers to the given question or problem. Thus,
they also cannot critically review the assertion of the expert (and typically
the expert is aware of this). In such a context, it might very well be the case
that the knowledge norm of assertion holds (respectively that the asserter’s
justification is required to be close to infallible).
In many contexts, however, we are in the position to critically review the
assertions of our peers and their reasons for these assertions (at least to some
extent) and the agents involved are typically aware of this. Thus, in such con-
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texts it would make sense to decrease the requirements for being permitted
to make an assertion. At the same time the requirements for being permitted
to trust the assertions of others could be increased. In such cases, agents can
exchange and critically review each other’s reasons. Consequently, we typi-
cally do not trust the assertions of our peers without any questions asked.
We are also not surprised if we are asked to provide reasons for our claims. In
these circumstances, (Justified Belief) might be the more appropriate norm.
(This also seems to be the norm of assertion practiced at science or huma-
nities conferences; (Knowledge) seems to be more often violated than not at
such events.)
With respect to (ii), it is possible that stakes influence what norms of
assertion are appropriate. To be more exact, it is possible that stakes influ-
ence how strongly an agent needs to be justified to be permitted to make
an assertion. Zollman (2015) already argued to the same effect for norms
concerning when to trust testimonial evidence. He argued that whether or
not an agent needs to be justified for being permitted to trust the testimony
of others depends on our epistemic stakes and goals. According to Zollman,
if the only epistemic goal is to minimize the number of false beliefs, then one
should only trust those testifiers that one has strong reasons to trust, but if
your goal is also to maximize the number of true beliefs, then it is better to
be more trusting. The same can be expected for norms of assertion. If agents
would only assert what they are absolutely certain of, they would further
the satisfaction of the epistemic goal to minimize false beliefs. These agents
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would also possibly satisfy (Knowledge). However, if agents make assertions
even if they are not absolutely certain but have good reasons to believe the
claims, they further the satisfaction of the epistemic goal to maximize true
beliefs at the risk of increasing the number of false beliefs. Such agents are
more likely to violate (Knowledge). Of course, these considerations apply
to epistemic stakes only. However, similar considerations might apply if the
stakes are of a more pragmatic nature. Further studies are necessary to test
the influence of the authority / expertise of the agent as well as the stakes
involved.11
6 Conclusion
We started our investigation by highlighting the importance of knowing the
norm of assertion. If knowledge were the norm of assertion, then people could
straightforwardly believe honest assertions made by other parties. However,
the knowledge account does not square with the empirical results that we ob-
tained in two experiments presented in this paper. The central experiments
favoring the knowledge account raise methodological concerns. Our first stu-
dy has shown that once these concerns are addressed, collected responses
from people reveal that truth and hence knowledge are not an integral part
of the norm of assertion. In our second set of studies, we widened the scope
11Turri (2013) as well as Turri & Buckwalter (forthcoming) tested the influence of stakes
on people’s responses in regards to the norms of assertion and did not find any significant
effect.
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of our investigation and provided evidence favoring the justified belief ac-
count of the norm of assertion. At least in many circumstances, people are
permitted to make a certain claim whenever they are justified in believing
that claim. No knowledge is required!
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